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Introduction+
+Recent! commentaries! (e.g.! Reich! 2013)! regarding! the! implications! of! persistent!Congressional!gridlock!have!suggested!that!we!will!see!a!significant!shift! in!power!to! the!states! with! regards! to! solving! many! of! our! most! significant! policy! problems.!! Gaining! a!better!understanding!of!the!politics!of!the!state!legislative!process!should!be!of!increasing!interest!to!us!all.!!Understanding!the!evolution!and!development!of!state!legislatures!is!vital!to!accomplishing!this!goal.!!!! Scholars!have!been!long!fascinated!by!the!evolution!and!development!of!legislatures!in!the!United!States.!!This!fascination!has!focused!predominately!on!the!development!of!the!United! States! Congress.! ! Countless! books! and! journal! articles! have! focused! on! the!development! of! congressional! committee! systems! (Shepsle!1986;!Weingast! and!Marshall!1988;! Baron! and! Ferejohn! 1989;! Maass! 1983;! Gilligan! and! Krehbiel! 1987,! 1989,! 1990;!Krehbiel!1991;!Kiewiet!and!McCubbins!1991;!Cox!and!McCubbins!1993;!Maltzman!1997),!political! party! structures! (Rohde! 1994;! Aldrich! 1995),! leadership! (Davidson,! Hammond!and!Smock!1998;!Peabody!1967,!1984;!Cooper!and!Brady!1981b;!Sinclair!1999;!Evans!and!Oleszek! 1999,! 2004;! Ripley! 1967)! and! procedural! rules! (Bach! and! Smith! 1988;! Sinclair!1994;!Krehbiel!1991,!1997;!Dion!and!Huber!1997;!Binder!and!Smith!1997;!Binder!1997;!Dion! 1997).! ! Other! works! have! addressed! generally! the! process! of! congressional!institutionalization!(Polsby!1968;!Froman!1968;!Davidson!and!Oleszek!1976).!Disproportionately! less! scholarly! attention! has! been! given! to! the! evolution! and!development! of! state! legislatures.! !Many! of! the! studies! of! state! legislative! evolution! and!development!that!do!exist!were!conducted!long!ago!and!typically!focus!on!the!development!of! a! legislative! institution! in! a! single! state! (Lewis! 1952;! Rosenthal! 1968).!More!modern!
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explorations! of! state! legislatures! have! focused! on! explaining! institutional! differences!across!state!legislatures,!with!little!attempt!to!track!institutions!over!time!or!determine!the!evolution! of! these! institutional! differences! (Rosenthal! 1973;! 1974;! 1997;! 2004;! 2008;!Francis!1989).!There!have!been!very!few!historical!treatments!of!state!legislatures!that!are!crossPsectional!in!nature.!!Notable!examples!are!Squire!and!Hamm’s!(2005)!101#Chambers!and!Squire’s!(2012)!The#Evolution#of#American#Legislatures.!!!Our!purpose!in!this!paper!is!to!consider!how!constitutions!impact!the!ability!of!legislatures!to!conduct!business!and!solve!policy!problems.!
The+Passage+of+Abortion+Restrictions,+A+Tale+of+Three+States+
+! Knowing! that! most! efforts! to! lobby! for! more! restrictive! abortion! policy! at! the!federal!level!is!futile!and!largely!a!waste!of!resources,!the!proPlife!movement!has!chosen!to!focus!its!resources!and!efforts!on!the!passage!of!laws!at!the!state!level.!!A!report!from!the!Guttmacher! Institute!states! that! in! just! two!years! (2011P2013),!205!abortion!restrictions!were!enacted!in!the!states!versus!189!during!the!previous!ten!years!(2001P2010)!(Nash!et!al.!2014).!!While!proPlife!advocates!naturally!will!target!ideologically!conservative!states!in!their! efforts! to! have! these! laws! enacted,! they! are! sometimes! enacted! with! substantial!controversy.!!In!the!summer!of!2013!the!legislatures!of!three!states!–!Texas,!Ohio!and!North!Carolina!–!passed!bills!that!restrict!abortion.!!Each!of!these!three!states!enacted!these!bills!in! very! different! ways,! which!were! influenced! by! state! constitutional! provisions! or! lack!thereof.!Texas!–!Out!in!the!Open!Senate!Bill!No.!5!was! introduced!during!a!special! session!of! the!Texas! legislature! in! June!2013.!!Special!sessions!may!only!be!called!by!the!Governor,!who!also!dictates!the!agenda!of!
! 4!
the!session!(Article!III,!Section!40!and!Article!IV,!Section!8!of!the!Texas!State!Constitution).!!The!bill!would!place!restrictions!on!abortion!that!many!asserted!would!lead!to!the!closing!of!most!of! the!abortion!clinics! in! the!state!of!Texas.! ! ! !Article! III,! Section!35!of! the!Texas!state!constitution!reads:!







! The!Texas!case!illustrates!one!case!in!which!because!of!the!single!subject!provision!in! the! state! constitution,! it! is! very! difficult! for! members! of! the! legislature! to! enact!potentially!controversial!legislation!using!procedures!that!could!possibly!mask!the!topic!of!the! legislation.! ! The! case! also! illustrates! the! possibility! that! some! state! constitutional!provisions! –! such! as! limits! on! session! length! –! can! be! used! to! help! a!minority! slow! the!progress!or!block!passage!of!a!bill.!Ohio!–!Using!the!State!Budget!as!Cover!! In! June!2013,!Governor! John!Kasich! signed!House!Bill! 59! into! law.! ! In! addition! to!including!appropriations! for! the!next! twoPyear!budget! cycle,! the!3,747!page!bill! included!provisions!that!did!everything!from!change!the!minimum!school!year!from!182!days!to!a!minimum!number!of!hours,!to!allow!the!cable!company!to!disconnect!service!once!a!bill!is!14!days!rather!than!45!days!late,!to!determining!the!housing!and!care!standards!for!snake!owners.! Amongst! numerous! nonPbudget! related! provisions!were! several! provisions! that!placed! additional! regulations! on! those! seeking! and! providing! abortions! (Siegel! 2013).! It!has! become! common! practice! in! the! Ohio! Legislature! to! tuck! potentially! controversial!substantive!law!adoption/changes!into!the!twoPyear!budget!bill!in!the!hopes!that!they!may!go!unnoticed!until!after!passage!(Siegel!2013).!!!! Just! like! the! Texas! Constitution,! the! Ohio! Constitution! contains! a! provision! that!limits!bills!to!a!single!subject.!!Article!II,!Section!15,!Part!D!of!the!Ohio!Constitution!reads:!“No!bill!shall!contain!more!than!one!subject,!which!shall!be!clearly!expressed! in! its! title.”!!The!many!provisions,!including!those!restricting!abortion!that!do!not!allocate!money!in!the!2013!budget!clearly!violates!this!rule.!!The!inclusion!of!these!various!provisions!in!a!single!bill!allows! logrolling! to!be!used!to!guarantee!passage!of! the!budget!as!well!as! these!nonP
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budget!related!state!laws.!!Once!enacted!into!law,!the!only!remedy!is!to!challenge!the!bill!in!court.! !Two!sets!of!groups!have!challenged!the!budget!–!the!ACLU!and!ACLU!of!Ohio!have!challenged! that! the! parts! of! the! bill! restricting! abortion! violated! the! Ohio! Constitution!singlePsubject! rule! and! the! Ohio! Civil! Service! Employees! Association! and! ProgressOhio!have! challenged! that! the! sections! that! authorize! the! privatization! and! selling! of! several!prisons!also!violates!the!single!subject!rule.!!!! To!date!no!ruling!has!been!made!on!the!October!2013!ACLU!suit.!!In!considering!the!Ohio!Civil! Service!Employees!Association!and!ProgressOhio! suit!over! the!privatization!of!prisons,! a! Franklin!County! trial! court!dismissed! the! case.! !However,! the!Franklin!County!Court!of!Appeals! found!that! the! legislature!did! in! fact!violate! the!single!subject!provision!and!has!ordered!the!trial!judge!who!dismissed!the!case!to!undertake!an!evidentiary!hearing!to!dissect! the!budget!bill! linePbyPline!and!strike!out!any!provisions!that!violate! the!single!subject! rule.! ! Ohio! Governor! Kasich! and! other! statePwide! officials! are! asking! the! state!supreme! court! to! overturn! the! appellate! court! decision! arguing! that! it! amounts! to! an!unconstitutional!judicial!linePitem!veto!(Ludlow!2014).!! The! Ohio! case! illustrates! the! strategy! of! burying! the! adoption! of! a! potentially!unpopular! or! controversial! policy! into! another! unrelated! bill! regardless! of! the!constitutionality.! ! Public! polling! suggested! that! a! majority! of! Ohio! voters! were! not!supportive!of!the!abortion!regulations!attached!to!the!budget!bill!(CulpPRessler!2013)!and!it!is!likely!that!a!standPalone!bill!may!have!been!more!difficult!to!pass.!!North!Carolina!–!Sneaking!it!Past!the!Minority!! In! North! Carolina! where! there! is! no! constitutional! requirement! requiring! single!subject!legislation,!the!July!2013!enactment!of!Senate!Bill!353,!the!“Motorcycle!Safety!Act,”!
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differed!in!each!state.!!In!Texas,!the!legislature!passed!their!law!without!violating!any!of!the!provisions! of! the! Texas! State! Constitution,! even! if! some! of! these! provisions! did! slow!passage!down.!!Members!of!the!Ohio!legislature!willingly!and!openly!violated!their!state’s!singlePsubject!constitutional!provision!–!a!provision!that!the!Ohio!Judicial!Branch!has!been!inconsistent!in!enforcing.! !Finally,! in!North!Carolina,!the!majority!party!was!able!to!sneak!the!abortion!restrictions!into!law!because!the!absence!of!a!similar!singlePsubject!provision!in! the!Constitution!allowed! the!party! to!use!a! seemingly!unrelated!and! innocuous!bill! as!cover.!
Why+Do+Constitutional+Provisions+Matter?+! Although!the!end!result!was!the!same!–!the!adoption!of!restrictive!abortion!policies!–!the!three!cases!above!illustrate!that!institutions!–!in!this!case!external!institutions!–!can!significantly!impact!the!processes!via!which!policy!making!occurs.!!Further,!these!external!constraints!if!not!followed!can!allow!for!some!to!question!the!legality!of!laws!passed!(e.g.!Ohio! case).! ! Further,! the! state! governments! control! the! passage! of! public! policies! that!directly! impact! the! lives! of! those! that! reside! within! their! borders,! and! we! should! fully!understand!the!“rules”!regarding!their!formation!and!passage.!As!Elazar!asserts:!“Thus,! the! states! remain! significant! determinants! of! the! quality! of! life! of! the!American!people.!!The!way!in!which!each!state!frames!and!allocates!powers!through!its! constitution! reflects! certain! conceptions! of! government! and! understandings! of!the! two! faces! of! politics! –! power! and! justice.! ! That! is,! state! constitutions! are!important!determinants!of!who!gets!what,!when!and!how!in!America!because!they!are!conceptual!and!at!times,!very!specific!statements!of!who!should!get!what,!when!and!how!(Elazar!1982:!17).”!!Hence,! it! is! vital! that! we! come! to! better! understand! the! constitutional! provisions! that!impact!the!legislative!process.!
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There! are! a! number! of! studies! that! indicate! that! external! institutions! have! a!tremendous!impact!on!the!adoption!of!public!policy.!!!!Recent!studies!find!that!the!impact!of!institutionally! based! contextual! factors! associated! with! legislatures! in! policy! making!situations!has!received!systematic!attention! in!existing!research.!Such!factors!are!seen!as!creating!the!“setting”—which!provides!constraints!as!well!as!benefits—within!which!policy!decision!making!activities!take!place.!In!discussing!the!impacts!of!context,!Goodin!and!Tilly!(2006)! identify! and! describe! an! array! of! possible! environmental! contextual! factors! that!could!impact!political/governmental!phenomena!and!advocate!their!use!in!research.! !The!focus!on!“constitutionally”!based,!contextual! traits! in!our!research!acknowledges!the!role!that!we!believe!the!nature!of!the!institutional!settingPbased!variables!play.!We!believe!that!the! nature! of! the! organizational/institutional/contextual! setting! of! the! legislature! as!created! by! constitutions! impact! the! ability! of! legislatures! to! develop! policies! separately!from! internal! institutions!such!as!chamber!rules.! !A! legislature’s!particular!constitutional!traits!may! severely! limit! the! ability! of! that! legislature! to! develop! the! appropriate! policy!solution!to!a!problem.!! Prior!research!regarding!legislative!decisions!on!a!wide!variety!of!policy!topics!has!identified!a!series!of!factors!that!affect!the!nature!of!policies.!Included!are!factors!identified!as! “institutional”! in! nature,! which! refer! to! various! components! of! the! larger! context! in!which! these! activities! take! place.! A! variety! of! specific! concepts! including! institutional!settings! (Engeli! 2012),! institutional! conditions! (Matsubayashi! and! Rocha! 2012),!institutionalized!arrangements! (Aksoy,!2012;!Franchino!and!Høyland!2008),! institutional!mechanisms! (Martin! and! Vanberg! 2005),! institutional! contexts! (McGrath! 2011),!institutional!rules!(Besley!and!Case!2003),!institutional!environment!(Lindberg,!Rasmussen!
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and!Warntjen!2008)!and!legislative!organization!(Anzia!and!Jackman!2012)!have!been!used!to!describe! these!variables.!Yet,!when! the!nature!of! these!variables! is!considered,!a!wide!variety!of!specific!factors!have!been!studied.!Of!importance!to!this!current!research!is!the!inclusion!of!a!variety!of!variables!that!are!usually!“constitutional”!or!“founding!document”!in! origin.! For! example! Aksoy! (2012)! found! that! voting! rules! used! to! pass! legislation!(unanimity! versus!majority! voting)! as! well! as! the! ability! to! include!multiple! topics! in! a!single!piece!of!legislation!(single!topic!restriction)!affected!“logrolling”!regarding!policies!in!the!EU! (550).! Similarly,!Crisp!and!Driscoll! (2012)! found! that! the!use!of! “position! taking”!versus! “indication”! voting! (rollPcall! voting)! in! two! Latin! American! settings,! affected! the!level! of! party! unity! on! policy! decisions! (90P91).! Finally,! Anzia! and! Jackman! (2012)!demonstrated! that! among! U.S.! state! legislatures,! the! availability! of! majority! party!committee!“gate!keeping!powers”!(a!nonPhearing!right!and!a!nonPreporting!right)!affected!“majority! roll”! rates! in! chamber! voting! (220P222).! ! The! source! of! these! institutions! (e.g.!constitutionally!or!external!vs.!chamber!rules!or!internal)!varies!extensively!across!the!U.S.!states.!! The!inclusion!of!such!variables!in!recent!policy!oriented!research!and!the!findings!of!a! positive! impact! reinforce! our! belief! that! the! nature! of! a! political! system’s! constitution!effects! policymaking..! ! However,! most! of! these! studies! are! found! in! the! comparative!literature! rather! than! the! literature! on! American! legislatures.! ! Further,! the! impact! of!external! institutions,! especially! those! found! in! state! constitutions,! has! been! largely!unaccounted!for!in!state!public!policy!studies.!!! Ignoring!the!impact!of!these!constitutional!powers!and!limitations!has!likely!limited!our! ability! to! properly! assess! the! reaction! of! legislators! to! important! public! policy!
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problems.! !First,!even!though!we!acknowledge! that! institutions!play!an! important!role! in!the! legislative! process,!we! have! focused!most! of! our! attention! on! those! institutions! (e.g.!committees,!chamber!rules)!that!exist!internally!in!the!legislature.! !We!have!illustrated!in!previous!work! that!state!constitutions!are!ripe!with!provisions! that!speak!directly! to! the!process!by!which! legislation! is!enacted!–!many!of!which!have! important! implications! for!guaranteeing!government!transparency,!minority!party!rights,!etc.3!Our!goal!in!this!paper!is!to!quantify!some!of!those!provisions!in!a!meaningful!way.! !The!next!section!of!this!paper!will!provide!a!brief!descriptive!analysis!of!the!breadth!of!provisions!found!in!the!legislative!articles!of!state!constitutions!that!impact!the!legislative!process.!!We!will!then!introduce!a!measure!–!constitutional#restrictiveness#that!operationalizes!the!extent!and!nature!of!these!provisions! that! clearly! illustrates! the! substantial! variation! that! exists! across! states.! ! The!final! part! of! the!paper!will! present! a! theoretical! framework! for!understanding!why! such!differences!exist!and!an!analysis!testing!that!framework.!














• Revenue!bills!must!originate!in!house;!!(Section!7)!Many! of! the! American! state! constitutions! are! not! as! reticent! in! their! outlining! of!legislative! structure! and!process.! !While! some! take! a!minimalist! approach! similar! to! the!national! document,! others! are! much! more! explicit! in! providing! detail! regarding! the!structure!and!functioning!of! the!state’s! legislature.! !Figure!1!displays!the!total!number!of!
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provisions!found!in!the!legislative!articles!of!each!current!state!constitution!as!well!as!the!U.S.!Constitution!related!to!the!legislative!process.5!In!reading!the!legislative!article!of!all!50!state! constitutions! and! the! U.S.! Constitution,! 309! different! types! of! provisions! were!identified.6The!states!are! ranked! in! the! figure! from!greatest!number!of!provisions!where!we!find!sixtyPseven!in!Alabama!to!least!number!of!provisions!where!we!find!eight!in!New!Hampshire.!!For!comparison,!the!U.S.!Constitution!contains!12!provisions!for!the!Congress!(diagonal!bar!in!the!figure).The!median!number!of!provisions!is!26.!Clearly,!great!variation!exists!in!the!number!of!items!that!appear!in!state!constitutions.!










the! total! number! of! provisions! (See! Figure! 1)! from!most! to! least.! Figure! 2! displays! the!number!of!legislative!powers!found!in!the!constitutions.!!The!most!powers!granted!by!the!constitution!can!be!found!in!Georgia!with!22!and!fewest!powers!granted!are!the!4!found!in!Vermont.!!The!median!number!of!powers!is!8.!!Some!examples!of!standard!powers!that!are!mentioned! in! virtually! all! constitutions! are! the! ability! of! the! chambers! to! determine! the!rules! of! procedure,! elect! chamber! leaders,! and! certify! the! elections! and! judge! the!qualifications! of! the! legislature’s! members.! ! Less! standard! powers! include! allowing! the!legislature!of!Rhode! Island! to!organize! ! the! legislative! chambers!by! law! if! it! chooses.! ! In!Washington! and! Maryland! an! extraordinary! majority! vote! may! allow! legislation! to! be!introduced!after!the!deadline!to!do!so.!!
[Figure+2+about+here]+! Figure! 3! displays! mandates! found! in! the! constitutions.! ! Alabama’s! constitution!contains!the!most!mandates!with!25!and!New!Hampshire’s!constitution!contains!the!least!with!2.! !The!median!number!of!mandates!is!10.! !Some!of!the!most!common!mandates!are!the! requirement! that!bills! contain!a! single! subject,! that! chambers!keep!a! journal!of! their!proceedings,!and!that!bills!be!read!on!three!different!days.!!Less!common!mandates!include!Wisconsin’s!mandate! that! the! legislature!must!provide! for! the!monthly!audit!of! the! state!Treasurer!and!Auditor!of!Public!Accounts;!a!provision!in!both!California!and!Massachusetts!that! requires! the! legislature! to! immediately! introduce! the! budget! bill! and! pass! it! by! a!certain! date,! and! finally! Mississippi’s! mandates! that! a! committee! on! local! and! private!legislation! must! be! created! to! which! all! bills! dealing! with! local! and! private! matters! be!referred!and!requiring!the!committee!to!justify!why!a!general!law!could!not!apply.!
[Figure+3+about+here]+
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! The! number! of! restrictions! is! displayed! in! Figure! 4.! ! The! Alabama! constitution!places! 25! restrictions! on! the! legislature! and! the!New!Hampshire! constitution! places! the!fewest,! just! one.! ! The! median! number! of! restrictions! is! 7.! ! Common! restrictions! on!legislative!activity! include!limits!on!session!length!and!prohibiting!the!passage!of! local!or!special!legislation.!!In!Michigan,!the!legislature!may!not!pass!a!rule!that!prevents!a!majority!elected! from! discharging! a! bill! from! committee! consideration.! ! The! Texas! constitution!restricts!what!tasks!legislators!can!do!during!the!session!–!the!first!30!days!are!devoted!to!the! introduction! of! bills,! acting! on! emergency! appropriations! and! confirming! recess!appointments! and! emergency! governor!matters.! ! The! second! 30! days! are! for! committee!hearings,! to! consider! bills! and! other! pending!matters,! and! governor! emergency!matters.!After!60!days,! the! legislature!shall!act!on!bills,!pending!matters!and!governor!emergency!matters.!
[Figure+4+about+here]+! One!goal!of! this!paper! is! to!develop!a!measure! that! conveys!both! the!amount!and!nature!of!the!provisions!found!in!state!constitutions!that!impact!how!legislatures!conduct!their! business.! ! These! provisions! create! the! context!within!which! legislating! occurs.!We!liken!that!context!to!a!cage.!!In!some!states!(e.g.!Vermont,!New!Hampshire,!Congress),!the!cage! is! quite! large! and! the! legislature! has! quite! a! bit! of! freedom! to! move! around! and!conduct!its!business!in!the!manner!it!chooses.!!In!other!states!(Alabama,!Louisiana,!Texas),!the!cage!is!much!smaller!and!the!legislature!faces!more!limits!on!its!ability!to!act.!!Figure!5!displays!a!measure!that!we!call!constitutional#restrictiveness.!!The!measure!is!calculated!by!taking!powers!granted!to!the!legislature!in!the!constitution!and!subtracting!the!number!of!mandates!and!restrictions:!
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! Constitutional#Restrictiveness#=#Powers#–#(Mandates+Restrictions).!! Subtracting!mandates!and!restrictions!from!powers!allows!us!to!better!describe!the!cage! in!which! the! legislature! operates.! ! Simply! assessing! the! total! number! of! provisions!does! not! accommodate! the! significant! variation! that! exists! regarding! the! effect! of! the!provisions.!!Focusing!on!the!numbers!of!each!type!of!provision!in!isolation!from!the!others!results! in! incorrect! evaluations! of! the! relative! power! afforded! to! legislatures! in! each!constitution.! ! For! example,! the! Alabama! constitution! lists! the! most! restrictions! on! the!legislature! as! well! as! the! second! most! powers.! ! If! we! were! to! look! at! each! measure!separately,!we!would!conclude!that!Alabama! is!one!of! the!constitutionally!most!powerful!legislatures,! but! also! one! of! the! most! restricted.! ! Alabama! also! possesses! the! most!constitutional! mandates.! When! you! calculate! Alabama’s! constitutional! restrictiveness!score,! Alabama! is! the! most! restrictive! states! with! a! score! of! P33! (17! powers! –! 50!mandates/restrictions).! Scholarly! treatments! of! state! constitutions! have! made! strong!arguments! regarding! the! nature! of! state! constitutions! and! how! they! differ! from! the!U.S.!Constitution.! !G.!Alan!Tarr!provides! a! compelling! argument! for!why!mandates! should!be!treated! similarly! to! restrictions! in! his! book! Understanding# State# Constitutions,! when! he!writes,!“Furthermore,! whereas! Marshall! viewed! grants! of! power! as! carrying! with! them!subsidiary!powers,!what!appear!as!grants!of!power! in!state!constitutions! typically!do!not!operate!in!that!fashion.!!The!state!provisions!may!be!included!for!emphasis,!indicating!powers!that! the!state!government!can!exercise,!without!enlarging!those!powers.! ! Or! they! may! direct! state! legislatures! to! exercise! powers! that! they!command.! ! Or! they! may! serve! to! overrule! judicial! decisions! limiting! legislative!power,! to! eliminate! questions! of! authority!where! state! power!was!doubtful,! or! to!indicate! exceptions! to! constitutional! provisions! on! the! legislature.! !Most+ often,+
however,+ these+ apparent+ ‘grants+ of+ power’+ function+ as+ limitations.+ + For+ in+ a+
constitution+ of+ plenary+ legislative+ powers,+ an+ authorization+ to+ pursue+ one+
course+ of+ action+ may+ by+ negative+ implication+ serve+ to+ preclude+ pursuing+
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alternative+ courses+ that+ were+ available+ in+ the+ absence+ of+ the+ ‘grant,’+ under+
familiar+legal+cannon+of+expression)uniusest)exclusion)alterius+(Tarr+1998:+9).”7++
+
[Figure+5+about+here]+Overall! the! trend! with! regards! to! constitutional! restrictiveness! is! negative.!!Constitutions!mandate!and!restrict! rather! than!grant!power! to! legislative!bodies.! !This! is!not! at! all! surprising! given! that! the! state! constitutions! have! largely! treated! the! power! of!state!governments!as!plenary.! !New!Hampshire’s!constitutional! restrictiveness!score!of!2!means! that! it! is! the! only! state! where! the! number! of! powers! granted! to! the! legislature!surpasses!the!number!of!mandates!and!restrictions!imposed!on!them.!!In!Alaska!and!Rhode!Island,! the! number! of! powers! and! mandates/restrictions! result! in! a! constitutional!restrictiveness! score! of! 0.! ! Alabama! and! Louisiana! possess! high! levels! of! constitutional!restrictiveness!with!mandates! and! restrictions! far! outpacing! powers! in! their! documents.!!Median! constitutional! restrictiveness! is! P8.! !What! explains! the! substantial! variation! that!exists! across! the! states?! ! The! next! section!will! discuss! a! theoretical! explanation! for! this!variation!and!proceed! to! test! its!applicability.! !A!higher! level!of! restrictiveness!may! limit!the! ability! of! the! legislature! to! solve! state! problems! by! effectively! cutting! off! policy!alternatives!or!making!it!much!more!difficulty!to!adopt!adequate!legislation.!!!
The+Plenary+Nature+of+State+Constitutions+and+Constitutional+Restrictiveness+The!U.S.!Constitution!clearly!delineates!the!Congress’!legislative!powers!in!Article!I,!Section!1!and! limits! the!Congress! to!only! those! “legislative!Powers!herein!granted.”! !The!Tenth!Amendment!further!limits!the!federal!government!by!granting!the!states!the!power!not! delegated! to! the! federal! government! or! prohibited! to! the! states.! ! Given! the! relative!brevity! of! the! national! document,! this! granted! substantial,! nonPdelineated! power! to! the!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7"Emphasis"added"by"authors"
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state!governments.!The!constitutions!adopted!by!the!states!reflect!the!vast!nature!of!what!was! left! unwritten! in! the! federal!Constitution! and! largely! conceived!of! state! government!power! as! plenary! and! granted! significant! plenary! powers! to! the! legislative! branch! in!particular!(Tarr!1998;!Elazar!1982).!Tarr!explains,!!“…state! governments! have! historically! been! understood! to! possess! plenary!legislative!powers!–!that!is,!those!residual!legislative!powers!not!ceded!to!the!nation!government! or! prohibited! to! them! by! the! federal! Constitution.! ! As! the! Kansas!Supreme!Court!has!observed:!‘When!the!constitutionality!of!a!statute!is!involved,!the!question! presented! is,! therefore,! not! whether! the! act! is! authorized! by! the!constitution,!but!whether!it!is!prohibited!thereby!(Tarr!1998:!7).’”!!Elazar! also! writing! about! the! plenary! nature! of! state! governments! explains! that! in!comparison!to!the!U.S.!Constitution,!the!state!constitutions!need!to!be!more!comprehensive!and!explicit!about!limiting!and!defining!the!scope!of!governmental!powers!(Elazar!1982).!! John!Dinan!(2009)!believes!that!historically!the!states!have!been!better!at!revisiting!their! constitutions!and!revising! their! institutions!and!governing!principles!based!on!past!experiences! or! fundamental! shifts! in! culture,! etc.! !He! asserts! that! constitutional! revision!and!amendment!processes!at!the!state!level!are!easier!relative!to!the!process!of!revising!or!amending!the!U.S.!Constitution,!and!thus!have!allowed!state!governments!to!evolve!in!ways!that!make!them!more!responsive!to!modern!problems.!!!! Finally,! Albert! Sturm! (1982)! in! his! work! on! state! constitutional! development!identifies!five!periods!of!state!constitutional!development:!1. The!First!State!Constitutions!(1776P1780)!–!These!constitutions!were!marked!by!the! establishment! of! strong! legislatures!with! significant! plenary! powers.! ! The!new!states!experience!with!colonialism!under!British!rule!left!them!distrustful!of!executive!power!and!the!legislative!branch!benefitted.!!2. Early!19th!Century!Developments! (1800P1860):!This!period!marked! the! rise!of!Jacksonian! Democracy.! ! It! coupled! with! public! discontent! with! legislative!
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dependency! in! their! work! (e.g.,! Lipset! and! Rokkan! 1967;! North! 1990;! Schickler! 2001;!Skocpol!1992;!Collier!and!Collier!1991;!Ertman!1996;!Hacker!1998).!We!believe!that!the!nature!of!constitutional!restrictiveness!as!it!exists!in!the!current!constitutions! is! largely!dependent!on!the! initial!starting!point!of! the!current!constitution.!!The!political!conditions!and!trends! influencing! the!content!of!constitutions!at! the! time!of!initial! adoption! are! likely! to! endure! even! as! time! progresses.! Therefore,!we! hypothesize!that!constitutional#restrictiveness#will!be!more!evident!in!states!that!adopted!their!current!constitutions!during!Sturm’s!Early!19th!Century!period,!the!Civil!War,!Reconstruction!and!Aftermath!period!and!the!Beginnings!of!Reform!Period.! !During!each!of!these!periods!the!trend! was! to! adopt! provisions! that! limited! legislative! activity! and! power.! ! We!operationalize! Sturm’s! periods! of! state! constitutional! development! using! four! dummy!variables:! 1)! 1800P1859;! 2)! 1860P1899;! 3)! 1900P1949! and! 4)! 1950P2014. 9 !! State!constitutions! were! coded! to! reflect! the! period! in! which! their! current! document! was!adopted.!Given! the! limited! number! of! cases! in! our! data! set! (51)10,! we! are! limited! in! the!number! of! additional! factors!we! can! analyze! in! our! analysis.! !We! include! two! additional!variables!that!may!account!in!some!part!for!the!variation!in!constitutional!restrictiveness!across!the!states.!!The!first!is!constitution#length.!!This!variable!is!measured!as!the!number!of!words! in! the! constitution! and!was! collected! from! the! 2013! edition! of!The#Book#of# the#
States.!We!expect! that! longer!constitutions!will!contain!more!provisions!and!are! likely! to!contain!more!mandates!and!restrictions!for!the!legislative!branch.!!The!second!variable!is!




constitution!can!be!amended!via!the!citizen!initiative.! !We!anticipate!that! in!states!where!amendments! may! originate! with! the! public,! there! will! also! be! a! larger! degree! of!constitutional! restrictiveness! as! citizens! are!more! likely! to! support! provisions! that! they!believe!will!make!government!more!transparent!and!curb!corruption.!!!Table!1!presents!the!results!of!a!number!of!OLS!regression!models.!!We!run!models!accounting! for! the! 1)! total! number! of! provisions! in! the! constitution! regarding! the!legislative! process;! 2)! total! number! of! powers! granted! to! the! legislature;! 3)! the! total!number!of!mandates!imposed;!4)!the!total!number!of!restrictions!imposed;!5)!the!number!of! mandates! and! restrictions! imposed! and! 6)! the! states’! constitutional! restrictiveness!score.!!
[Table+1+about+here]+The!time!period!within!in!which!the!most!recent!constitution!was!adopted!is!both!a!strong! and! consistent! predictor! of! constitutional! restrictiveness! and! its! components.!!Model! I! uses! the! total! number! of! provisions! in! the! constitution! and! as! expected!constitutions! adopted! in! each! of! Sturm’s! periods! contain! between! 7! and! 14! more!provisions! than! those! adopted! in! the! first! state! constitutions! period! (1776P1799).!Additionally,! and! as! expected! longer! constitutions! contain! more! provisions.! ! The! only!variable! not! significant! is! amendment! by! initiative.! ! Quite! a! bit! of! the! variance! in! total!provisions!is!explained!by!this!model!–!the!RPSquare!is!.6616.!The!results! for! the!models!analyzing!mandates!(Model! III),! restrictions!(Model! IV)!and! mandates+restrictions! (Model! V)! are! consistent! with! the! Model! I! –! all! of! the! time!period! variables! are! statistically! significant! and! in! the! anticipated! direction.! ! In!constitutions! adopted! in! each! of! these! eras,! we! can! expect! to! see! on! average! more!
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mandates!and!restrictions!on!the!legislature!than!in!constitutions!adopted!preP1800.!!These!models! also!account! for!quite! a!bit! of! variance!as!well! –!with!RPSquares!of! .5242! for! the!mandates!model,! .6056!for!the!restrictions!model!and! .6570!for!the!model! that!combines!mandates!and!restrictions.!!Similar!to!Model!1,!greater!constitutional!length!results!in!more!mandates! and! restrictions! and! the! ability! of! the! public! to! initiate! the! amendment! of! the!constitution!has!no!statistical!influence!on!the!number!of!mandates!and!restrictions!found!in!the!document.!The! model! accounting! for! provisions! that! bestow! powers! (Model! II)! on! the!legislature!does!not!perform!as!well!as!the!other!models.!!Only!two!of!Sturm’s!time!periods!achieve! statistical! significance! –! the! Civil!War,! Reconstruction! and! its! Aftermath! (1860P1899)!and!PostP1950!(1950P2014).!!Both!were!positive,!but!the!substantive!impact!of!just!an! additional! 2! to! 4! powers! is! smaller! than! for! the! other!models.! ! As! anticipated! longer!constitutions!contain!more!powers!for!the!legislature!and!the!ability!of!the!public!to!amend!the! constitution!does!not! result! in! any!more!powers! for! the! legislature! in! the!document.!!Finally,! this! model! only! accounts! for! about! onePthird! of! the! variation! in! the! number! of!constitutional!powers!granted!to!the!legislature!(RPSquare!=!.3326).!Finally,! Model! VI! displays! the! regression! results! for! the! model! employing!constitutional! restrictiveness! as! the! dependent! variable.! ! Recall! that! this! variable! was!constructed!by!subtracting! the!number!of!mandates!and!restrictions! from!the!number!of!powers!contained!in!the!constitution.!Larger!negative!values!indicate!that!the!provisions!in!the!constitution!place!greater!restrictions!on! the! freedom!of! the! legislature! to!act.! !Given!Sturm’s! work! we! anticipate! negative! relationships! between! the! four! time! periods! and!constitutional!restrictiveness.!!The!results!of!Model!VI!confirm!our!expectations.!!In!each!of!
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the!four!periods,!the!coefficient!is!statistically!significant!and!negative.!!In!accordance!with!Sturm’s!observations!as!we!move!through!each!period,!states!that!adopted!constitutions!in!these!periods!increasingly!restrict!the!legislature!more!relative!to!states!that!adopted!their!constitutions!preP1800.!!Further,!although!the!coefficient!is!negative,!the!magnitude!of!the!coefficient!(slightly!less!than!the!earlier!periods)!for!the!postP1950!period!indicates!that!in!this! era! states! that! adopted! constitutions! placed! fewer! restrictions! on! their! legislatures!than!states!adopting!constitutions!in!the!earlier!periods.! !Once!again,! longer!constitutions!are! on! the!whole!more! restrictive! and! the! ability! of! the! people! to! initiate! constitutional!amendments! has! no! effect.! ! This! model! accounts! for! just! over! half! the! variation! in!constitutional!restrictiveness!with!and!RPSquare!of!.5398.!The!results!of!the!analysis!provide!substantial!support!to!the!notion!that!history!and!context!likely!exert!great!influence!on!institutional!choice!and!development.! !Sturm’s!four!time!periods! of! state! constitutional! development! are! consistent! and! strong! predictors! of!both!constitutional!restrictiveness!on!the!legislative!process!as!well!as!the!total!number!of!provisions,!mandates!and!restrictions!regarding!the!legislative!process.! !The!time!periods!were! slightly! less! consistent! when! trying! to! predict! powers! regarding! the! legislative!process!found!in!state!constitutions.!!This!is!likely!the!case!because!of!the!plenary!nature!of!state!legislative!power!in!the!earliest!constitutions.!!In!most!states,!the!legislatures!initially!existed!in!a!context!where!they!possessed!significant!power.!!Subsequent!constitutions!and!amends!were!then!much!more!concerned!with!imposing!mandates!or!restrictions!to!reign!in!that!power!rather!than!bestow!additional!powers!to!the!legislative!branch.!
+ +
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Discussion+and+Conclusion+This!analysis!makes!it!apparent!that!many!states!constitutions!treat!their!legislative!branch!differently!than!the!U.S.!Constitution!treats!Congress.!!The!general!pattern!has!been!for!greater!detail!in!state!constitutions!regarding!what!the!legislature!may!do,!must!do!and!should!not!do!in!terms!of!the!legislative!process..!!Further,!state!constitutions!are!far!more!likely!to!focus!on!the!must!do!and!should!not!do!over!the!may!do.!!Considered!as!a!whole,!these!provisions!form!a!cage!that!confines!state!legislatures!as!they!conduct!their!business.!!When!there!are!few!mandates!and!restrictions!relative!to!powers,!the!legislature!has!been!granted!a!large!cage!in!which!to!work.!!In!these!states,!the!legislature!often!possesses!wide!latitude!in!the!ways!in!which!it!can!act!to!resolve!the!policy!problems!of!the!day.!When!the!number!of!mandates!and!restrictions!imposed!far!outpaces!the!number!of!powers!granted,!the! cage! becomes!more! confining,! and! the! legislature! may! be! lacking! adequate! tools! to!address!the!policy!challenges!it!faces.!Also,!this!paper!accounts!for!why!some!state!legislature’s!cages!are!bigger!or!smaller!than!others.!!We!found!that!history!and!context!are!the!driving!forces.!!The!political!forces!of! the! day! can! account! for!whether! or! not! states! have! chosen! employ! the! constitutional!document! to!delineate,!mandate!and!restrict! the!activity!of! legislatures.! !States!operating!under! constitutions!adopted! in! the!preP1800!period!have! far! fewer! legislative!provisions!overall!and!far!fewer!mandates!and!restrictions.!This!is!largely!reflective!of!the!distaste!for!executive!rule!immediately!following!the!American!Revolution.!!However,!both!provisions!and!mandates!and!restrictions!increase!as!political!movements!(e.g.!the!rise!of!Jacksonian!Democracy,!Progressive!Era,!etc.)!begin!to!demand!more!transparency!and!less!corruption!and! the! legislatures! become! targets! of! constitutional! provisions.! ! Finally,! in! the! latter!
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period! (Post! 1950)! there! is! some! attempt! to! start! strengthening! legislatures! relative! to!other!state!government!branches.!There!are!several!avenues!we!intend!to!explore!in!future!research.!!The!first!would!be!to!determine!how!constitutional!restrictiveness!influences!the!structures,!processes!and!outputs! of! legislatures.! ! Does! constitutional! restrictiveness! impact! the! types! of! policies!adopted?! !Does! it! impact!who!chooses! to! serve?! !Can! the! concept!be!used! to!explain! the!internal!rules!that!members!adopt?!!Does!it!affect!the!efficiency!of!the!legislative!process?!Second,! in! this! paper! we! only! considered! constitutional! provisions! found! in! the!legislative! article! of! the! constitution! that! impacted! the! legislative! process.! ! Our! earlier!research!(Martorano,!Hamm,!Hedlund!2014)!found!that!significant!powers,!mandates!and!restrictions!on! legislative!activity! can!be! found! in!other! sections!of! the! constitution.! !For!example!sections!on!taxation!and!revenue!often!include!many!provisions!that!limit!how!the!legislature! can! raise! revenue! and! appropriate! that! revenue.! ! Constitutions! also! include!provisions! that!grant! the! legislature!differing! levels!authority! regarding! the!regulation!of!voting!and!elections.!!These!are!just!a!few!quick!examples.!!In!future!research,!we!hope!to!be!able!to!map!these!provisions!in!order!to!present!a!more!comprehensive!description!of!the!cage!within!which!legislatures!exist.!Finally,! it! is! our! contention! that! analysis! of! these! legislative! constitutional!provisions! constitutes! a! vital! component! to! our! understanding! of! the! development! and!functioning!of!state!legislatures.!!Our!current!theories!of!these!institutions!to!date!have!not!taken! this! part! of! the! story! into! account.! ! Therefore,! our! understanding! of! how! state!legislatures!operate!and!form!public!policy!are!incomplete.!! !
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7.392***!(1.852)!! 1.123!(.738)! 4.126**!(1.506)! 2.144**!(.840)! 6.270***!(1.692)! B5.147**!(1.840)!
1860M1899'
Period''
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N' 51! 51! 51! 51! 51! 51!
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